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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock and Scott Dullea 
 
How involved is Putin in administration workings? 
In attacking putative opponents, President Vladimir Putin has targeted primarily 
his predecessor’s holdovers. This is not ground-breaking news. However, his 
political housecleaning is more subtle and nuanced than was initially apparent. 
Take, for instance, the (so far) protracted tenure of Prime Minister Mikhail 
Kasyanov, directly linked to the Yel’tsin administration. Recently, Kasyanov has 
questioned the competence of two Putin appointees, Finance Minister Alexei 
Kudrin and Minister of Economic Development and Trade German Gref. (TVS, 9 
Apr 03; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) These criticisms have not been 
rebutted publicly. However, accusations of corruption have begun to surface 
regarding Kasyanov’s own involvement in fishing quotas. Some Russian 
newspapers are predicting that Kasyanov is slated to become the election-year 
scapegoat for Russia’s economic difficulties. His own criticisms of Kudrin and 
Gref, therefore, might constitute a preemptive strike -- Kasyanov is an intelligent 
man and can sniff which way the wind is blowing. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 7 
Apr 03; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Putin appears to be treating this matter as an internal squabble between 
Kasyanov and his subordinates. Coverage of a meeting between Putin and 
Kasyanov, shortly after these headlines began appearing, contained no mention 
of the burgeoning "fish-gate" scandal, nor of the squabble within the cabinet. 
Having thus remained officially uninvolved, Putin can exploit whatever situation 
emerges: reaping the rewards, should the economy improve, or, should the 
economic picture become bleak, having the prime minister’s head on the political 
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chopping block. (KOMMERSANT, 10 Apr 03; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
Rushailo’s removal rumored 
In the currently impotent Security Council, Putin has appointed Valentin 
Stepanov to serve as deputy to Secretary Vladimir Rushailo. Kremlin watchers 
speculate that this signals Rushailo’s possible removal from the Security Council. 
Stepanov is an experienced Russian politician and functionary, who served as 
general prosecutor until 1993, and does not suit the role of mere deputy. If he 
were promoted, it might imply increased prominence for the Security Council. 
With a Putin appointee at its head, the Council would constitute yet another 
extension of the president’s political power. (ZAVTRA, 10 Apr 03; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Putin opponent silenced 
Following Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov’s murder on 17 April, talk of a 
politically motivated assassination is spreading. Yushenkov had been an active 
opponent of the Kremlin administration. He loudly voiced suspicions of FSB 
involvement in the 1999 Moscow apartment bombings that led to Putin’s War in 
Chechnya, as well as to his subsequent rise to the presidency. (VEDOMOSTI, 18 
Apr 03; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Boris Berezovsky, the self-exiled 
oligarch who faces an extradition hearing in London, has claimed that he will 
produce documents soon to prove this connection. 
 
What motivates recent appointments? 
In March 2003, Putin rearranged the security services, leading to the 
appointment of FSB veteran Viktor Vasilievich Cherkesov as the Kremlin’s new 
"drug tsar." Consequently, Putin filled Cherkesov’s former post as presidential 
envoy for the Northwest Federal District with Valentina Matvienko. Speculation 
about the motivation behind both of those appointments — including efforts to 
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regenerate a modern KGB and to build a stronger "power vertical" -- circulated 
immediately. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 26 Mar 03) 
 
On 3 April Putin met with Cherkesov to discuss the progress of the new Russian 
anti-drug agency, officially titled The Federal Committee for the Suppression of 
the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs. Cherkesov noted the need to retrain 
immediately staff members from the Federal Tax Police Service (FSPN) who are 
being transferred to his new agency. (ITAR-TASS, 3 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0403, via World News Connection) The anti-drug committee will consist of 
40,000 personnel, three-quarters of whom will come from the recently liquidated 
FSPN. The drug agency also will inherit most of the disbanded tax police 
service’s material resources. Despite Cherkesov’s assurances, some law 
enforcement specialists have their doubts about the feasibility of transforming tax 
police (who are often more the administrative than the gung-ho type) into drug 
fighters. (IZVESTIA, 9 Apr 03; What the Papers Say, via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Some analysts fear that there is more to Cherkesov’s appointment, as well as to 
the drug agency’s establishment, than meets the eye. The creation of this entity 
does not gel with the concept of centralizing the security-related agencies under 
the umbrella of three ministries. And the fact that Cherkesov gained all the 
human and material resources from the former tax police service also raises 
questions. Some specialists do not rule out the possibility that Cherkesov’s 
agency may be a forerunner to a new, extensive secret service performing key 
functions currently belonging to the interior ministry. (SOVERSHENNO 
SEKRETNO, Apr 03; What the Papers Say, via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Adding to Cherkesov’s team, President Putin last week relieved Alexandr 
Fedorov, Cherkesov’s former deputy when he served as presidential envoy in the 
Northwest Federal District, and brought him to Moscow to serve again as deputy 
to Cherkesov. Until this presidential decree, Fedorov had been serving as deputy 
to Cherkesov’s successor, Matvienko. 
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Fedorov’s Kremlin-appointed replacement in the Northwest Federal District, 
Colonel-General Andrei Chernenko, raises questions concerning early 
speculation about the reasons for Putin’s selection of Matvienko as the 
presidential envoy. Originally it was believed that her appointment was intended 
to allow her to use the envoy position as a stepping stone toward the St. 
Petersburg gubernatorial elections in 2004. (REUTERS, 2 Apr 03; via Johnson’s 
Russia List) Matvienko’s new deputy, Chernenko, has held the post of a deputy 
interior minister and headed the Federal Migration Service, an agency under the 
interior ministry. If the original theory of Matvienko’s appointment were correct, 
then perhaps Chernenko had been intended to become the envoy once she 
became governor. (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 8 Apr 03; What the Papers Say, via 
Lexis-Nexis) 
 
However, according to another theory, Chernenko is there to "look after" 
Matvienko to ensure she does not gain the support required to run for governor, 
thus paving the way for his good friend (and former prime minister) Sergei 
Stepashin, the current chairman of the parliamentary Audit Chamber, who is 
reported to be interested in the gubernatorial post. Given the long political 
alliance between fellow FSB officers Chernenko and Stepashin, it is likely that 
Stepashin would have Putin’s support in the upcoming poll, and Chernenko’s 
task would be to help ensure his victory. (WWW.GAZETA.RU, 8 Apr 03; via 
Johnson’s Russia List) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Scott Fleeher 
 
The silence is deafening 
Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) continues to remain tight-lipped with 
regard to the seemingly endless list of revelations concerning its relationship with 
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Iraq. The head of the SVR press bureau, Boris Labusov, provided a classic 
response to the newest wave of allegations: "We do not comment on baseless 
and unproven assertions published in the tabloids." (INTERFAX, 13 Apr 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0413, via World News Connection) The "baseless and unproven 
assertions" originated in part from secret documents recently uncovered in Iraq. If 
proven authentic, these allegations-turned-evidence could be quite illuminating 
with regard to Russian-Iraqi intelligence relations. 
 
The list of data recently surfacing begins with reports that Arabic-language 
documents discovered in a destroyed Iraqi Mukhabarat headquarters on 12 April 
reveal more cases of direct SVR assistance to Iraqi intelligence. One document 
is said to contain details of a (presumably bugged) conversation between British 
PM Tony Blair and Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi, purportedly quoting Blair as 
questioning United States policy toward Baghdad. (THE TELEGRAPH, 13 Apr 
03) 
 
Other documents recovered from the rubble reportedly reveal that Moscow 
provided the Iraqi regime with a list of assassins who could be employed for 
"hits" in the West. In this virtual "Yellow Pages" of assassins, signed by an agent 
calling himself "SAB," Moscow indicated that it was more than willing to share 
these services with associates in Baghdad. (THE TELEGRAPH, 13 Apr 03) 
 
Another document uncovered by the newspaper appeared to confirm the 
existence of a nuclear arms program in Iraq. In the March 2002 document, 
Russia warned the Iraqis that failure to comply with the UN mandates could give 
the United States "a cause to destroy any nuclear weapons." (THE 
TELEGRAPH, 13 Apr 03) Such a warning is remarkable in that the Baghdad 
regime denied possession of any such weapons to the very end. 
 
Several other papers found amid the rubble chronicle Russian information 
regarding arms deals with other Middle Eastern countries, along with information 
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detailing how Russia could assist Iraqi politicians in procuring visas to Western 
countries. (THE TELEGRAPH, 13 Apr 03) A number of the documents mention 
that Osama bin Laden constructed training camps in Afghanistan in order to train 
mujahideen fighters for service in Chechnya. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Ansel Stein 
 
Is Russia reassessing its power in the post-Saddam Hussein world? 
The speed and ease with which the American armed forces plowed through 
Iraq’s army appears to have jolted some in Moscow into a more realistic view of 
Russia’s position in the world. "The key conclusion we must draw from the latest 
Gulf war is that the obsolete structure of the Russian armed forces has to be 
urgently changed," Vladimir Dvorkin, head of the Russian defense ministry's 
official think tank on strategic nuclear policy, said last week. "The gap between 
our capabilities and those of the Americans has been revealed, and it is vast. We 
are very lucky that Russia has no major enemies at the moment, but the future is 
impossible to predict, and we must be ready." (THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, 16 Apr 03) The Council on Foreign and Defense Policy–a group of 
top Russian military experts and former policymakers–recently concluded that 
the Kremlin must drop all post-Soviet pretense that Russia remains a 
superpower, and make rebuilding and redesigning the nation's military forces a 
top priority. Other analysts are calling on Russia to reassess it position politically, 
especially its membership in the "axis of weasel." "Tactically, they [Russia, 
France and Germany] must know they have lost through miscalculation and they 
have to accept this. They must also know that they will lose much more heavily if 
they continue to oppose the United States and attempt to keep their axis going," 
said Dmitry Trenin. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 14 Apr 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
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Re-thinking in Moscow is evident also in the recent adjustment in Russian 
relations with North Korea. On 11 April, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr 
Losyukov said that a nuclear-armed North Korea was against Russian national 
interests and that the Kremlin would re-evaluate its opposition to international 
penalties should the North Koreans develop nuclear weapons. However, 
Losyukov subsequently again denounced America’s stance vis-à-vis Pyongyang: 
"The United States would rather stay on the margins, taking part in negotiations 
led by a group of countries. Such an approach has no prospects, and we will not 
get involved with it." (INTERFAX, 14 Apr 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
By 15 April, Losyukov said that Russia "can only welcome" North Korea's 
announcement that it was ready to join multilateral talks with Washington over its 
weapons program. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 14 Apr 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
The same day, a South Korean official stated that "[the] North sees no reason for 
Japan and Russia to join the multilateral talks because it wants to discuss the 
abolition of the armistice pact and the signing of a nonaggression pact with the 
United States during the forum." Instead of Japan and Russia, North Korea wants 
the European Union (EU) to join the multilateral forum in an apparent hope that 
the EU may play a leading role in providing economic aid to North Korea, the 
official reportedly said. (BBC MONITORING INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, 15 
Apr 03; via Lexis-Nexis) That the DPRK would not want Japanese participation 
should come as no surprise, but the revelation that Pyongyang perceives no 
benefit from having Russia involved is interesting. By 17 April, the Russian 
foreign ministry was reduced to saying, "We would welcome any format for 
negotiations and any agreement that would lead to a peaceful settlement." The 
US State Department, the proponent of multilateral talks, even began to leave 
Russia out of the formula. Spokesman Philip Reeker said that the United States 
hoped to expand the talks in later rounds: "We are looking for the early inclusion 
of Japan and South Korea." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 17 Apr 03; via Lexis-
Nexis) 
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Did Russia find out that North Korea did not want its support? The North wants 
economic aid which the EU, and not Russia, can provide. Russia’s inability to 
offer realistic solutions is another cause. During Ivanov’s recent trip to Seoul, 
Moscow’s proposal was for Russia to guarantee the North’s security. After the 
war in Iraq, this is no guarantee. 
 
Putin has offered that he sees the need "to coordinate the efforts of the 
international community in order to make real progress in the effort to guarantee 
lasting peace in the Middle East." (ITAR-TASS, 16 Apr 03; via Lexis-Nexis) This 
clearly contrasts with Russia’s doom-and-gloom predictions of the consequences 
of confronting Iraq; however, this is only the public face of Russian policy. It is 
very doubtful the subterranean world of Russian arms sales and intelligence 
training will end any time soon. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
MEDIA 
Russian government rejects US allegations, then proves them 
The US Department of State issued its annual reports on the state of human 
rights internationally and Moscow was quick to note its general dissatisfaction 
with the result. Certainly, the evidence refutes media ministry claims that the 
government supports a free press. But that should come as no surprise to 
anyone who has watched the situation for any length of time. 
 
In its report on Russia, the State Department noted that officials at the federal 
and regional levels regularly hindered the media: 
 
 9 
"At times the authorities exerted pressure in a number of ways on journalists, 
particularly those who reported on corruption or criticized officials. They 
selectively denied journalists access to information, including, for example, 
statistics theoretically available to the public and filming opportunities. On many 
occasions, particularly in regions outside Moscow and St. Petersburg, they 
demanded the right to approve and then censored certain stories prior to 
publication and prohibited the tape recording of public trials and hearings. They 
systematically withheld financial support from government media operations that 
exercised independent editorial judgment and attempted to influence the 
appointment of senior editors at regional and local newspapers and broadcast 
media organizations. On occasion they removed reporters from their jobs, 
brought libel suits against journalists, and intimidated and harassed journalists," 
the report said. (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2002, 31 Mar 03; 
via www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18388.htm) Moreover, increased state 
control over outlets through outright ownership or majority stake-holdings in 
media groups "continued to undermine editorial independence and journalistic 
integrity in both the print and broadcast media," the report warned. 
 
Direct attacks on journalists’ independence could be seen. "As in 2001, the 
senior staff of [the state-owned] RTR — the station with the most extensive 
coverage area — reported that managers offered ‘guidance’ to program 
announcers and selected reporters, indicating which politicians should be 
supported and which should be criticized; criticism of presidential policies was 
discouraged strongly and even prohibited," the report said. 
 
More blatant restrictions also occurred, the report added: "At times government 
officials actively restricted freedom of press, particularly during election 
periods…. For example, reporters from the newspapers Nezavisimaya gazeta 
and Komsomol’skaya pravda were denied access to a polling station in Voronezh 
during city council elections; armed police in Volgograd prevented New Wave 
Radio and Alternative Broadcasting News correspondents from observing vote 
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counting during mayoral elections. The Moscow City Electoral Commission 
prevented correspondents from Novyye izvestiya newspaper and Russian Public 
Television (ORT) from attending a meeting where the registration of mayoral 
candidates would be discussed, on the grounds that ORT would draw ‘a distorted 
picture of the Commission's performance.’ … Journalists who published critical 
information about local governments and influential businesses, as well as 
investigative journalists writing about crime and other sensitive issues, continued 
to be subjected to death threats, threats of beatings, and other physical violence 
by unknown assailants." (Many of these instances have been reported in earlier 
issues of The NIS Observed.) 
 
Citing what it views as violations of media freedom by US officials during the war 
with Iraq, the Russian media ministry said it "takes with sarcasm attempts by the 
American Department of State to describe Russia as a country without a free 
press." (INTERFAX, 1446 GMT, 1 Apr 03; BBC Monitoring International Reports, 
via Lexis-Nexis) Indeed, the press service asserted, the ministry "reaffirms the 
inviolability of the principles of freedom of speech and the independence of 
media in Russia, hoping that US statements will be more balanced and unbiased 
in the future." 
 
Such assurances aside, of course, the ministry has worked to weaken the power 
of any remaining independent press in Russia, most noticeably through 
discussions of a draft law in the fall of 2002 that would have hobbled the media 
from coverage of any organization that the government deemed "terrorist." (THE 
NIS OBSERVED, 20 Nov 02) While President Putin eventually vetoed that law, 
familiar concepts from the earlier draft have resurfaced, now with the 
acquiescence of media owners. On 8 April, managers of leading media groups 
signed an anti-terrorist convention that details rules of conduct for journalists 
during a terrorist attack or a counter-terrorist operation. (INTERFAX, 1555 GMT, 
8 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0408, via World News Connection) The convention 
appears to be somewhat of an improvement over the earlier bill: It is a voluntary 
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acceptance of limitations, rather than a legislated mandate, and it provides 
specific parameters of when such limitations on coverage of "terrorist" activity are 
in force. 
 
Meanwhile, the State Duma has launched another attack, by way of amendments 
to the Law on Elections proposed by President Putin. These proposals have 
evoked vociferous complaints from … just about everyone. Alexander Lyubimov, 
president of Media Soyuz, noted that the amendments provide for suspension of 
mass media activity after two warnings from the Central Election Commission. 
Moreover, he said, the amendments contradict earlier agreements between the 
media and government that "no changes would be made to the current laws on 
the mass media and we would work on creating a new law." (INTERFAX, 1533 
GMT, 31 Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0331, via World News Connection) 
 
Despite Duma passage in the first reading, the future of the proposed 
amendments does not look too bright. "[T]he State Duma draft law proposes that 
the procedure for revoking mass media licenses be simplified. The mass media 
will be punished for the slightest infringement. But even that is not the main thing 
— the point is that this amendment essentially has nothing to do with citizens’ 
electoral rights. Because it will also apply to the periods of time between 
elections," Viktor Ignatov, a member of the Federation Council Commission for 
Information Policy, said. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 11 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0414, via World News Connection) The head of the Central Elections 
Commission, Alexander Veshnyakov, admitted that he also had problems with 
the Duma-approved law. Veshnyakov said his commission was ready to work 
with journalists to draft amendments to the bill. "We do not want licenses to be 
withdrawn. We are ready to remove these provisions and clarify many other 
aspects concerning suspending the functioning of media outlets involved in legal 
violations. We will submit our amendments when the bill goes to the second 
reading," he said. (INTERFAX, 1322 GMT, 4 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0404, via 
World News Connection) 
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The UNESCO Department of Intellectual Property, headed by Mikhail Fedotov, 
the secretary of the Union of Russian Journalists, reviewed the draft and noted 
several incongruities. For example, a media outlet that has been charged with — 
rather than convicted of -- administrative violations twice is vulnerable to 
penalties. Fedotov offered as assurance his belief that the closing of publications 
or television stations likely would occur rarely. (VREMYA MN, 19 Mar 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-0320, via World News Connection) However, Fedotov did note that, if 
the new mass media bill were to be passed, editorial independence would be at 
risk, as the entire legal framework affecting the media would change. 
Interestingly, Fedotov sees the media minister as the guarantor of press 
freedom. "Lesin made a very big contribution to it. Moreover, the power given to 
the press ministry by the bill is so enormous that all of us should be asking God 
to leave Lesin at the top of the ministry as long as possible. If someone who does 
not share liberal market values comes in his place, the law will become a noose," 
Fedotov said. (Ekho Moskvy, 1030 GMT, 17 Apr 03; BBC Monitoring 
International Reports, via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
While the proposed amendments to the election law have been the most 
controversial, they are not the Duma’s only attempt this session to govern the 
media. Three additional bills are to be discussed, including legislation that would 
ban scenes of violence, torture and murder conspiracy (except, one assumes, on 
the news). (ITAR-TASS, 1637 GMT, 4 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0404, via World 
News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Steve Kwast and Dan Rozelle 
 
Russia struggles to figure out the lessons learned from Iraq’s defeat 
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The jury is still out as to whether Russia will learn the right lessons from the 
overwhelming defeat of Iraq by the coalition forces over the last month. Many in 
Russia are using that defeat as a platform to put their own spin on the 
consequences of the war. 
 
Top administration officials apparently refuse to see the outcome’s military 
significance, while others within the government understand the implications. 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov used his recent visit to South Korea as a platform 
to articulate the official stance about the war’s consequences. "All regimes will 
want to obtain nuclear arms as the only containment factor. In circumstances 
when a blow [is] struck on the UN prestige and role, many states around the 
world will prefer to act at their own discretion, without heeding international rules 
and previously achieved agreements, including the non-proliferation sphere." 
(IZVESTIA, 11 Apr 03; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) Such rhetoric insinuates that a worldwide arms race will result. 
Another administration official, Air Force Commander Colonel General Vladimir 
Mikhailov, opted for a sales pitch. "It’s easy to fight meeting no resistance. I 
assume the Americans made an excessive use of the aviation [force]; the 
situation didn’t require that. If Iraq had [the new Russian] S-300 missile 
complexes, U.S. pilots wouldn’t have that much bravery and ostentatious 
resolution," he claimed. (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 14 Apr 03; WPS Defense and 
Security, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Others in the administration, however, clearly understand the significance of 
Iraq’s defeat. At the New Army Concept conference, which opened in Moscow on 
9 April, prominent politicians, soldiers’ mothers, military experts and political 
consultants discussed the Iraq situation. Army General Makhmut Gareev, 
president of the Academy of Military Science, said, "we must take immediate 
measures to overcome the technological gap between US and Russia in the 
sphere of high-precision weapons, the role and significance of which the Iraqi 
war evidently displayed." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 10 Apr 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
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Likewise, former Russian Air Force commander General Petr Deinekin said, "the 
main lesson for Russia from the current conflict in Iraq is that we should enhance 
preparedness for war." He noted that 80 percent of the weapons used in the Iraq 
war are high precision, compared to just 10 percent in the 1991 Gulf War and 40 
percent during the 1998 campaign in Yugoslavia. 
 
Additionally, retired General Aleksandr Rutskoi, who served as Boris Yel’tsin’s 
vice president from 1991-93, said "Russia should cancel its military-reform plans 
and instead begin improving its military capabilities. Anyone can see that we 
must forget the demagoguery of armed-forces reform and begin to restore our 
defensive and offensive capabilities." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE SECURITIES, 9 Apr 
03) A defense ministry source was more specific: "[T]he military conflict in Iraq 
has yet again confirmed that the trends for developing the Armed Forces are 
quite clear. [The trends] stem from the strengthening of the role of aviation, 
guidance systems and high-precision ammunition, as well as from the decreasing 
role of tank troops in tackling combat tasks during local wars." (INTERFAX, 0958 
GMT, 31 Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0331, via World News Connection) Clearly 
some persons in Moscow see Iraq’s defeat as a reason for reform and 
modernization. 
 
Sergei Ivanov and General Mikhailov would be wise to listen to these other 
voices in their administration. They also should look to see how this war is 
changing the way countries act before they conclude that the war on Iraq will 
destabilize the world and create an arms race to nuclear weapons. To Russia’s 
east, for example, "North Korea may have softened its stance on the nuclear 
crisis as a result of the war in Iraq. I think the war might have prompted a change 
in the international political landscape," South Korea’s national security advisor 
Ra Jong-Yil said. (DECCAN HERALD, 14 Apr 03; WPS Defense and Security, 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) To Russia’s west, Belarusian President 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka said he has approved a military exercise for October 
codenamed "Clear Skies." "The exercise will be modeled approximately in such a 
 15 
way as the war in Iraq is developing today, in order to resist such a mass attack 
by a possible enemy," Lukashenka said. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 9 Apr 03) 
 
Actions speak louder than words. In this case, international actors such as North 
Korea backing down from hard-line positions against the US indicate that 
predictions of increased arms races and weapons proliferation might be nothing 
more than hype. Closer to the truth might be that coalition forces acting against a 
belligerent international threat have posted notice to the rest of the world to 
behave. It also indicates that other nations take serious the threat of force if they 
harbor terrorists or develop weapons of mass destruction. Russia will do well to 
learn the lesson that true military reform is mandatory if it wants to increase its 
capability and modernize. Such a lesson is the only responsible one to learn if 
Moscow expects to provide security for its people in the 21st century. 
 
Is US success in Iraq a military defeat for Russia? 
The scene in central Baghdad of US Marines helping Iraqi civilians topple a 
statue of Saddam Hussein squelched criticism by many analysts of the US 
military's war plan. While the present success silenced some critics in the US, it 
also exposed the outdated tactical mindset of the Russian military. The entirely 
off-the-mark predictions of Russia’s defense "experts" prior to and during the war 
speak volumes about how Russia's military leaders might fight a war themselves. 
 
Consider the following analysis and critiques offered by the Russian press as 
well as current and former senior Russian military officers -- some of whom may 
actually have had a hand in preparing Iraq's poorly executed defense: 
 
"It will be extremely difficult to break the multi-layer defences of Baghdad, 
including self-sustained reinforced positions with dug-in tanks and other anti-tank 
assets, as well as large underground trench net," stated Colonel General 
Vladislav Achalov, a former Soviet deputy defense minister and specialist in 
urban warfare, who visited Iraq repeatedly before the war. "I used to see their 
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(Iraqi) training in the so-called central guerilla camp, and I am bound to say that it 
was similar to the training of [Russian] special operations units," he added. 
(Interfax-AVN, 7 Apr 03; BBC Monitoring, via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Former defense minister and current Duma Deputy General Igor Rodionov 
stated, "I observed the Desert Storm in 1991... Iraqi servicemen surrendered 
without a fight by the thousands then. The situation is wholly different these days. 
I used to think that Saddam Hussein's popularity was somewhat ostentatious but 
now I see that I was mistaken. Iraq is united and rallied and can put up a worthy 
fight. Even [if] it had it, Iraq should not use chemical warfare means: heat, 
changing winds, the possibility of infecting its own troops...." General Rodionov's 
statement here is especially noteworthy since he seems to believe that chemical 
weapons should not be used by the Iraqis not because they are (supposedly) 
unavailable or unlawful, but because of tactical battlefield drawbacks. 
 
Another former Russian general, Valentin Varennikov, once a commander of 
Russia’s ground forces, also weighed in: "As for the Iraqi command, I’d 
recommend counter-strikes and counter attacks. This is a viable option because 
the Iraqis do have tanks and artillery. I think this is the tactic they will choose. 
Wherever the terrain permits it, the Arabs will resort to guerrilla warfare, putting 
oil to fire." (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 26 Mar 03; What the Papers Say, via ISI 
Defense and Security Database) The tactics espoused by General Varennikov 
are simplistic at best and somewhat naïve. They amount to little more than telling 
the Iraqis to fight back. His remark about burning oil was, however, realized. The 
Iraqis did burn oil to obscure potential targets in Baghdad but the effect was 
negligible since global positioning system-guided bombs do not require the pilot 
to see the target. 
 
Major General Nikolai Revazov, Candidate of Military Science and former military 
advisor to Syria, stated, "There can be no doubts that the coalition will not go for 
a frontal assault. It will lay siege to Baghdad and start bombing it day and 
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night…the allies will set up sorts of garrisons around Baghdad, a process that will 
take about a month. The garrisons will be mostly supplied by air transports. That 
is why the paratroops will have to seize at least six airfields more first…seizing all 
of the territory of the country will not mean triumph. I do not think that [US 
General Tommy] Franks has considered it yet…. As for the capital itself, the 
siege may take as long as needed…fighting in Baghdad will occur only when 
presidential bunkers or other underground objects are approached." (Stolichnaya 
VeCHERNAYA GAZETA, 4 Apr 03; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and 
Security Database) 
 
The Russian media, supported by their own "armchair generals," forecast that, 
"the Pentagon will make broad use of non-lethal weapons in Baghdad. For 
example, army chemists may use CS gas, pepper aerosols, and so-called 
tranquilizing gases." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 7 Apr 03; What the Papers Say, 
via ISI Defense and Security Database) 
 
Even Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, surely familiar with how the US military 
operates, missed in his prediction that, "If the Americans continue to fight 
accurately, avoiding high casualties, the outcome is uncertain. If the Americans 
begin carpet bombing, Iraq will be defeated." (THE ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
15 Apr 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Clearly the Russian military views the war in Iraq through the lenses of its own 
experience and tactics in Chechnya. According to Pavel Felgenhauer, a Russia-
based independent military analyst, "It would appear that the Russian generals 
and (Defense Minister Sergei) Ivanov assume it’s the Americans that should be 
learning from them how to flatten cities — the way our military destroyed the 
Chechen capital, Grozny." (One might add -- based on the Russian press 
statement above — the example of the hostage rescue attempt in the Dubrovna 
theater, in which used "so-called" tranquilizing gases killed the hostage takers as 
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well as many of the hostages.) (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 10 April 03; via Lexis-
Nexis) 
 
Grozny, as Felgenhauer mentions, stands as Russia's textbook example of how 
not to conduct urban warfare. The Russians stormed the Chechen capital on 
New Year’s Eve in 1994 only to lose nearly 2,000 troops in a matter of days. With 
little intelligence information, the Russians entered the city in tanks and 
personnel carriers, quickly becoming lost and immobilized. The Chechens easily 
decimated the poorly trained Russian soldiers. Stung by its military failure, the 
Russian army pulled back and launched an indiscriminate bombardment that 
razed the city. After two months and an estimated 25,000 civilian casualties, the 
Russians finally took the capital. Unfortunately, the conflict in Chechnya 
continues today and the Russian military seems to have learned little from the 
experience. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 5 Apr 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Obviously some of the statements quoted above can be ascribed to the typical 
propagandistic bluster often heard from Russian politicians and senior military 
officers. But the mindset displayed shows the tactical bankruptcy of the Russian 
military. The speed, precision and efficiency with which the US military operates 
surely must have shaken and embarrassed all those responsible for Russia's 
security. Even Russia’s lowest-ranking servicemen must be asking questions. 
Why else would Anatoly Kvashnin, chief of the General Staff, order the urgent 
production and posting of patriotic slogans and other paraphernalia in military 
headquarters, libraries and barracks and lead discussions to improve 
servicemen's morale? (RossiYskaya Gazeta, 21 Mar 03; What the Papers Say, 
via ISI Defense and Security Database) 
 
Whether they can learn from the US military's experience in Afghanistan and Iraq 
remains to be seen. So far the refusal of Russia’s senior officers to embrace any 
type of reform -- elimination of conscription, brutality and corruption, reducing the 
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forces' sheer size to a more manageable organization -- indicates that they 
continue to cling to an outdated and discredited Soviet military model. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Nadezda Kinsky and Scott Fleeher 
 
UKRAINE 
New neighbors 
When the EU Treaty of Accession was approved in Athens on 9 April and signed 
on 16 April, an important step was taken towards extending the borders of the 
EU deep into Eastern and Central Europe. One of the most important statements 
of the day was the conclusion that there would emerge a Europe that had moved 
beyond iron curtains. The treaty's second paragraph states that "This union 
represents our common determination to put an end to centuries of conflict and 
to transcend former divisions on our continent." After the treaty has been ratified 
and backed by referenda in the accession states, 10 new countries will become 
EU members; 8 of them had been within the Soviet sphere. Throughout the 
accession debate, one of the hot topics has been the need to avoid another iron 
curtain, moved farther East. Ukraine is one of the countries that will form the 
EU’s new border from 1 May 2004. Kyiv has noted its concern with the future 
status of the changed borders, particularly with Poland. The move towards 
concrete EU enlargement is also once again a forum in which to explore the 
course of Ukrainian foreign policy and its aspirations and chances of EU 
accession. 
 
In March, Ukraine received some blows to its plans to move closer to Europe, 
particularly when German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer denied the country’s 
chances of attaining EU member status "now or in the foreseeable future." 
Nevertheless, President Leonid Kuchma continues to declare his wish to 
integrate Ukraine into NATO and the EU, although he does at times find himself 
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at odds over his country’s orientation vis-à-vis Russia. Fischer’s rejection of 
Ukraine's EU hopes was considerably toned down on 9 April by German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, however, who tentatively backed Ukraine's plans. 
Talking to Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, Schroeder said "We fully 
support the process of bringing Ukraine closer to the European Union. In the not-
too-distant future, there must be the possibility of associate EU status for 
Ukraine." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 10 Apr 03) The day before the EU accession 
treaty was signed, Kuchma chose to reiterate Kyiv’s hopes: "Ukraine will be 
going ahead with its entry into the EU to the extent that Europe will be entering 
Ukraine." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 16 Apr 03) In his speech, he praised European 
standards and values, which he said must become "part and parcel" of everyday 
life in Ukraine. He also framed two recent foreign relation issues within this 
context. On the one hand, he portrayed his presidency in the CIS -- which had 
largely been interpreted as a move closer to the Russian sphere of influence -- 
as an opportunity to increase Ukrainian influence in the region. He also cited his 
recent decision to deploy an anti-nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) 
weapons battalion to Kuwait despite considerable domestic opposition as a move 
towards constructive dialogue with the US and as "a sign of our civilized nature 
and our commitment to universal values." 
 
Ukrainian foreign policy is likely to be affected noticeably by the presidential 
elections in 2004. One of the most probable candidates to stand for the 
opposition is Victor Yushchenko, who has continued to receive the highest 
approval rating in recent polls concerning potential presidential contenders. 
(INTERFAX, 11 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0411, via World News Connection) 
Yushchenko is known for his pro-Western stance. What is certainly clear with a 
single look at the map of Europe is that, with this round of accessions, the EU 
has not yet finished the journey. As European Parliament President Patrick Cox 
noted when the treaty was signed, "Today, here in Athens, in returning to this 
cradle of civilization and democracy, we mark a decisive step forward in our 
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common journey to a European Union and a European continent which is whole 
and complete." 
 
BELARUS 
Mixed signals 
On 14 April, the US and 14 EU countries lifted their travel ban on top officials in 
Belarus, which had been imposed in response to the expulsion of the last OSCE 
mission in the country. Since a new OSCE mission has begun operations in 
Minsk, the lifting of the travel ban was overdue -- although the real reasons for 
disapproval of the Lukashenka regime (i.e., its dictatorial environment and 
appalling human rights record) are far from improved. Juxtaposing the decision to 
lift the travel ban, a resolution on the human rights situation in Belarus was 
entered on the agenda of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva on 16 
April. Belarus Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Savinykh condemned the 
move, and called the resolution "politically motivated." (INTERFAX, 9 Apr 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0409, via World News Connection) The resolution was co-
written by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia 
and was sponsored by the United States, where the "Belarus Democracy Act" 
recently was submitted to Congress. Unlikely to be passed before next year, the 
bill would secure approximately $40 million to support the democratic opposition 
and human rights groups in Belarus in a clear move against the Belarusian 
president. 
 
Since his contested reelection in 2001, Lukashenka has continued his harsh 
regime, and the country has endured economic hardship as well as a highly 
restrictive media environment and judicial persecution of the opposition. In recent 
months, the government met with very mixed signals from the West: clear 
rejection of its policies, as well as moves that served to feed the pro-Lukashenka 
channels with positive spins. The lifting of the travel ban is the latest example of 
the latter, while the UN resolution, a highly symbolic document following close on 
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the heels of recent appalling human rights reports, is a clear example of the 
former — another statement of disapproval of the Lukashenka regime. 
 
Such mixed signals are unlikely to sway the regime's behavior significantly, as 
long as it retains the grip it has on the country. Extreme isolation of the 
leadership would inevitably carry with it a negative effect for the Belarus people, 
who are in dire need of economic and human rights support, just as extending 
tacit approval indiscriminately would give the regime too much leeway. While the 
West’s contradictory measures may be one way of treading a middle path 
between the two extremes, the Belarus opposition and public would no doubt be 
thankful for a more consistent line. 
 
The decision to lift the travel ban is linked further to Belarus' future status as an 
EU neighbor country. The ban was removed in time to allow a representative of 
the Minsk leadership to attend the Athens conference for the current and 
acceding EU members, including three countries that border Belarus -- Lithuania, 
Latvia and Poland. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
GEORGIA 
Storm in a teacup 
The Russian Duma voted overwhelmingly (350 in support, three against and one 
abstention) on a resolution calling a recent military agreement between the US 
and Georgia "an act running counter to the spirit of good-neighborliness and 
cooperation 
 
between the Russian Federation and Georgia." The Duma deemed the 
agreement an "unfriendly act," and a violation of the Conventional Forces in 
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Europe (CFE) Treaty. (ITAR-TASS 0749 GMT, 16 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0416, 
via World News Connection) 
 
In response, the Georgian foreign ministry said it was surprised by "the Duma's 
overreaction to steps taken by a neighboring sovereign state towards developing 
military cooperation with its ally under the antiterrorist coalition." Moreover, 
interpreting the Georgian-US agreement as a violation of the CFE Treaty "does 
not [call for] any criticism," the statement says. (INTERFAX, 16 Apr 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-0416, via World News Connection) The CFE limits quantities of 
weapons and soldiers, which are not affected under the new document. 
 
At issue was the ratification -- after months of deliberation in Georgia's parliament 
-- of an agreement governing the legalities of the implementation of the US Train 
and Equip mission. The new agreement, ratified on 21 March, makes no changes 
whatsoever in the existing program, according to which 80 US special forces 
officers have been engaged for a year in training Georgian special forces to 
conduct counter-terrorist operations. The new agreement allows US soldiers and 
civilians working for the US Department of Defense, while on official assignment, 
to enter Georgia without a visa, to carry arms, and to receive standard diplomatic 
immunity. (AP, 21 Mar 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
According to the Georgian ambassador in Moscow, Zurab Abashidze, the most 
recent agreement closely resembles those signed as part of the NATO 
Partnership for Peace training programs and does not indicate any change in the 
security architecture of the Caucasus. (EKHO MOSKVY, 17 Apr 03; via 
www.echo.msk.ru) If Russia wishes to have regular security dialogue with 
respect to Georgian-US cooperation, Abashidze offered to form a Moscow-
Washington-Tbilisi forum for discussion of mutual security concerns, such as 
terrorism and the conflict over Abkhazia. 
 
CHECHNYA 
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The new constitution 
On 23 March, the Chechen Republic obtained a new constitution. According to 
the official version, 80% of the electorate participated in the referendum and over 
95% voted in favor. (LOS ANGELES TIMES, 24 Mar 03) 
 
The constitution pretends that the Chechen Republic is a Federation subject like 
an ordinary Russian region. Three features of the document are particularly 
noteworthy. First, there is no residency requirement for presidential or 
parliamentary candidates. (Article 66) This means that the Kremlin is not limited 
in its choice of future Chechen presidents to ethnic Chechens or indeed to 
persons who have had any connection to Chechnya. Second, Moscow will 
closely supervise appointments within Chechnya. Putin will have unlimited power 
to remove the Chechen president, (Article 75) and the federal procuracy will have 
complete control over the Chechen procuracy, including appointments, and 
determining the duties and responsibilities of the republican procuracy officials. 
(Articles 103 and 104) Finally, Chapter 10, which governs the transfer of power 
from the existing administration to the new government, makes it amply clear that 
the administration simply will be renamed a new government. For instance, 
Akhmad Kadyrov, the present head of the Russian-installed administration, has 
become acting president of Chechnya until elections are held, probably in 
December. Until a Chechen parliament is elected (probably in March 2004) the 
council of local administrations will perform the functions of a parliament. There is 
no reason to suppose that the facelift from "administration" to "president" and 
"parliament" will have an impact on what have been utterly ineffective institutions. 
 
Conditions after referendum 
According to recent reports from the human rights monitoring groups Human 
Rights Watch and Memorial as well as the French newspaper Le Monde, it is not 
possible to speak of any improvement of conditions in Chechnya. 
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Le Monde caused a sensation on 12 April when Natalie Nougayrede published a 
summary of an official document attesting that more than 100 Chechens civilians 
are executed every month. The document, which had been presented to Putin in 
late March 2003, counts 1,314 murders of Chechen civilians in 2002. "These are 
deaths which happened away from any armed confrontation, artillery fire, 
bombardments or explosions of remote-controlled mines. It's a calculation of the 
victims of summary executions." The document also provides other previously 
unknown details about 49 mass graves. The document makes it clear that the 
emergencies ministry and other government structures are compiling detailed 
lists of bodies and mass graves found in Chechnya that far surpass estimates 
produced by Memorial and Human Rights Watch. (CHECHNYA-SHORT LIST, 15 
Apr 03; via Chechnya-sl@yahoo.com) 
 
Human Rights Watch reported on 7 April that the practice of night raids where 
masked men drag off civilians is ongoing, with about three persons disappearing 
every week. 
 
"In a disturbing new trend, Russian forces increasingly resort to blowing up the 
bodies of executed Chechens -- a crude ploy that eradicates signs of torture, 
obscures the cause of death, and makes identification of the corpse extremely 
difficult. Human Rights Watch documented three such cases. Memorial, a 
Russian non-governmental human rights organization with permanent offices in 
Chechnya and Ingushetia, documented thirty-eight cases in January and 
February in which the corpses of Chechens were found; in twenty of these cases, 
the bodies had been blown up." (WWW.HRW.ORG) 
 
The Memorial report on the conduct of the referendum noted numerous grenade 
attacks in and around Grozny leading up to the vote. Protest against the 
referendum attracted 300 attacks in the city center on 22 and 23 March. 
Memorial also documented many infractions of normal voting procedure. 
Memorial activists were able to vote repeatedly because registration was not 
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required. At a polling station in Grozny, they counted only 243 persons entering 
the station, while 1457 votes were reported. In some locations more than 100% 
of those eligible voted because they were told that those who did not vote would 
be subject to FSB reprisals, or that pensions would be withheld. "Generally, 
anxiety was visible in all settlements. People believed that each citizen who did 
not vote or voted negatively would be considered a supporter of Maskhadov and 
this could lead to reprisals." (WWW.MEMO.RU) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
Russia, defense and dissent on jihad 
As Russia seeks to expand its influence in the region, several Central Asian 
states are moving to cultivate a renewed closeness with the Putin administration, 
particularly in trade and military relations. These republics share similar views 
regarding threats to existing power structures. And, as all players in the region 
are anxious to develop further available resources, Islamic extremism remains a 
threat that unites policies and enhances military budgets. 
 
A closer relationship with Russia 
The Central Asian states (except Uzbekistan) are placing greater emphasis on 
their relationship with Moscow. As Russia builds up a rapid-deployment force in 
Kyrgyzstan, under the Collective Security Treaty (CST), Tajik members of 
parliament have expressed a desire for increased bilateral cooperation with 
Russia. (ITAR-TASS, 1632 GMT, 16 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0416, via World 
News Connection) The Russian military maintains a strong presence in 
Tajikistan, primarily assisting with drug control along the Afghan border, but 
many Tajiks want to strengthen Russo-Tajik relations by integrating more deeply 
bilateral economic and trade activities. Tajik President Emomali Rahmonov, in a 
meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, emphasized the importance 
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of a Russian technological and economic presence in Tajikistan’s development. 
According to Rahmonov, both sides must be "united in the fact that it is 
necessary to raise radically the level of economic cooperation between the two 
countries." (ITAR-TASS, 0646 GMT, 11 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0411, via World 
News Connection) 
 
Turkmenistan, which recently discovered a large gas and oil field in the Caspian 
Sea (the Shatut field), also has made gestures toward Russia. (ITAR-TASS, 
1503 GMT, 16 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0416, via World News Connection) 
During a recent visit to Moscow, Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov and 
Russian President Putin signed an energy deal worth up to $500 billion over 25 
years. The economic interests imbedded in such a relationship also led to the 
signing of a security accord. (EURASIANET, 15 Apr 03; via www.eurasianet.org) 
The collapse of Saddam Hussein’s authoritative control over Iraq’s oil reserves 
no doubt left an impact on the Turkmen leader, one of the more oppressive world 
leaders remaining in control of substantial oil reserves; the recent agreements 
with Russia may bolster Niyazov’s level of confidence. 
 
Kazakhstan, with its large energy reserves and a substantial Russian population, 
continues to work with Moscow. Putin stressed in a recent meeting with Kazakh 
President Nursultan Nazarbaev, "We are not just neighbors, we are close 
neighbors." (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 16 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0416, via 
World News Connection) Nazarbaev, in clear reference to the importance of 
developing stronger ties, said that "a close neighbor is better than a distant 
relative." (INTERFAX, 1511 GMT, 15 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0415, via World 
News Connection) Putin met with Nazarbaev in Omsk and expressed concern 
that trade turnover between the two countries dropped 11 percent between 2001 
and 2002. (ITAR-TASS, 1243 GMT, 15 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0415, via World 
News Connection) Both have agreed to become more active in promoting trade 
along the border regions. Furthermore, Putin urged that Russia and Kazakhstan 
integrate at a military level and "move to a joint defense of borders." (ITAR-
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TASS, 1213 GMT, 15 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0415, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Developing the military and countering calls for jihad 
Under the CST, Russia has been working with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan (as well as Belarus and Armenia) to develop the rapid-deployment 
collective forces, standardizing equipment and building up a presence in 
Kyrgyzstan. (ITAR-TASS, 1542 GMT, 8 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0408, via World 
News Connection) Kazakhstan, however, is taking steps to develop its defense 
industry. Nazarbaev has ranked the revival of the defense industry as one of his 
priorities, and said that new weapons should be developed and old arsenals 
restored. (INTERFAX, 1529 GMT, 15 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0415, via World 
News Connection) Learning from the experience of US-led forces in Iraq, the 
Kazakh military conducted exercises in the Caspian region of the country. 
According to Kazakh military sources, the Batys-2003 military maneuvers were 
the first of their kind in 11 years. (INTERFAX, 0623 GMT, 16 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-
2003-0416, via World News Connection) 
 
One reason for the Kazakh military exercises and the development of the rapid-
deployment collective forces is the fear of militant Islam. Groups such as Hizb-ut 
Tahrir (HT) are increasingly active throughout the region. According to local 
police, HT pamphlets distributed in Chimkent in southern Kazakhstan had 
changed: "They used to be anti-Israel, and now they contain anti-American 
propaganda." (INTERFAX, 0815 GMT, 10 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0410, via 
World News Connection) HT literature circulated and confiscated in Kyrgyzstan 
called for a "jihad against the infidels who unleashed a war against Iraq." 
(INTERFAX, 1026 GMT, 6 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0406, via World News 
Connection) While the non-US military buildup in the region is not directly 
connected to such anti-American propaganda, anti-Americanism does represent 
an economic and security threat to the governments that are seen as being 
friendly with the US. 
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In Ufa, Russia, Mufti Talgat Tajuddin, head of the Central Muslim Spiritual Board 
of Russia, called for a jihad against the US, a statement that was downplayed by 
the Patriarchate of Moscow as "an emotional outburst." (ITAR-TASS, 1409 GMT, 
4 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0404, via World News Connection) Regardless of the 
emotional nature of such pleas, they are often directed at an unsettled population 
and cause concern for the governments and more moderate Muslims. 
 
Abdurashidkori Bakhromov, head of the Uzbek Muslim Board, said that "we 
should view such calls as actions misguiding the Muslims, but benefiting the 
destructive extremist groups and certain forces." (INTERFAX, 0806 GMT, 5 Apr 
03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0405, via World News Connection) Echoing those concerns, 
the spiritual leader of the Tajik Muslims and chairman of the Ulema Council, 
Amonullo Nematzoda, spoke against jihad, saying that it would only "increase 
bloodshed and the unwanted sufferings of ordinary people." (ITAR-TASS, 1020 
GMT, 4 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0404, via World News Connection) 
 
While the cautions of Bakhromov and Nematzoda clearly reflect the positions of 
the government, the military buildup reflects the state’s concern regarding the 
more radical Islamic influences, such as HT. And it is such threats, as well as 
mutual economic interests, that will pull the governments of Central Asia and 
Russia closer together. 
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